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Under Utah law, did the trial court correctly grant summary dismissal and conclude as a 
matter of law that Plaintiff/ Appellant John David Ingles' (hereinafter "Plaintiff') Complaint 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where ( 1) Plaintiffs non-conclusory 
allegations in his Complaint, even if taken as true, do not establish acts attributable to Defendants 
sufficient to support a claim for alienation of affection, (2) Plaintiffs claim for negligent 
interference with the marital relationship is unsupported by Utah law, (3) Plaintiffs allegations 
in his Complaint, even if taken as true, are not of the nature or degree supporting recovery in an 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) Plaintiffs allegations in his 
Complaint are insufficient to establish that the Defendants' conduct constituted negligence of the 
type likely to cause severe and unmanageable mental distress in a reasonable person normally 
constituted. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees Larry Leon 
Woodrum and Loretta Wood Woodrum (hereinafter "Defendants") need not provide a statement 
of the issues or of the case unless the Defendants are dissatisfied with the statement of the 
Plaintiff. 
However, Defendants disagree that Issue # 1 as set forth by Plaintiff is an issue herein. 
Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, not a motion for 
summary judgment; therefore, there is no need to discuss whether or not there were disputed 
material facts. See Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light. Co., 823 P.1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). 
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Defendants also disagree that Issue #3 as set forth by Plaintiff is complete. Plaintiffs 
cause of action in the district court was not merely one for negligence but one for negligently 
interfering in the marital relationship of Plaintiff and Lore lee Woodrum Ingles (hereinafter 
"Spouse"), a cause of action which does not exist in Utah law. 
Plaintiff also sets forth what he believes to be the determinative law in these areas. Rule 
24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure make no request for a statement of the 
determinative law. Although Defendants disagree with some of Plaintiffs claimed 
"determinative" law, Defendants do not address those disagreements here, but put forth what 
they understand the "determinative" law to be in their argument. (R. 24.) 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-l 03(2)U). 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no statutory or constitutional provisions relevant to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case concerns a disgruntled former son-in-law (Plaintiff) who, after he filed for 
divorce from Spouse, filed with the Third District Court, in Case No. 140907351, claims for 
alienation of affection, negligent interference with the marital relationship, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against his former mother-in-
law and father-in-law (Defendants). (R. 1-28.) Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (R. 30-31.) After a full briefing, the district 
court entered its Ruling and Order, dismissing each of Plaintiffs claims for failure to state a 
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claim and granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 377- 381). Plaintiff now appeals the 
district court's ruling. 
As this case concerns the sufficiency of Plaintiffs pleaded allegations as set forth in his 
Complaint, Appellees defer to the allegations in the Complaint itself. Instead of an unnecessary 
and repetitious lengthy reiteration of those facts herein, Defendants direct this Court to the 
Complaint as set forth in the Record (R. 1-26.) and attached as Addendum C to Plaintiffs Brief. 
In his Brief and in his Objection to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff has incorporated 
allegations not present in the Complaint. Any and all additional allegations, not already present in 
the Complaint are excluded from Defendants' recitation of the facts has they are extraneous to 
the Complaint and an analysis of the sufficiency of a complaint is confined to the allegations 
within the pleading itself. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A Motion to Dismiss challenges the sufficiency of a complaint in stating a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, thus the analysis of whether a complaint is sufficient is confined to 
the allegations within the pleading itself. The trial court appropriately refused to consider any 
allegations outside of those in the Complaint. Plaintiff has attempted to bolster the sufficiency of 
his Complaint once again by including allegations in his Brief which were not presented in his 
original Complaint. As this Court is reviewing a Rule l 2(b )( 6) Motion to Dismiss, any 
allegations outside of the Complaint should not be considered. As the district court chose not to 
consider any allegations or exhibits outside of the Complaint, it also appropriately chose not to, 
on its own initiative, convert the Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Although the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true when 
considering a motion to dismiss, the sufficiency of a complaint must be determined by the facts 
pleaded rather than the conclusions stated. As set forth, Plaintiffs Complaint is made up of 
primarily vague, unrelated and/or unsupported conclusory allegations, without specific facts to 
support these conclusions. While numerous conclusory allegations are made, the facts 
specifically alleged are insufficient to support a claim for alienation of affection, negligence, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Plaintiff failed to assert facts in his Complaint which show Defendants willfully and 
intentionally alienated Spouse's affections for Plaintiff resulting in the loss of Spouse's 
consortium. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged facts showing an intention on 
Defendants' part to alienate wife's affections resulting in the loss of contortion, such acts were 
not the controlling cause of the dissolution of the marriage, but merely one aspect of many other 
causes and factors within the marriage which, when combined, easily outweigh any alleged 
conduct on Defendants' part. As such, the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs claim for 
alienation of affection should be affirmed. 
Plaintiff, while entitling his claim as one for negligence, asserts that Defendants 
negligently interfered with the marital relationship of Plaintiff and Spouse. No such cause of 
action exists under Utah law and Plaintiff cites to no legal authority supporting such a claim. As 
such, the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs claim for negligence should be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs alleged non-conclusory facts in his Complaint, even if taken as true, fail to 
demonstrate that Defendants intentionally engaged in conduct toward the Plaintiff that was 
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outrageous or intolerable or of the nature or degree supporting recovery in a an action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to state any specific form 
of extreme emotional distress. As such, the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress should be affirmed. 
Plaintiff fails to allege in his Complaint any symptoms of severe physical or mental 
manifestations of emotional distress. Instead, Plaintiffs facts, as pied, are bare allegations of 
emotional distress without sufficient factual examples evidencing severe emotional distress. As 
such, the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress should be affirmed. 
In light of Plaintiffs failure to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court 
should affirm the district court's grant of dismissal of all Plaintiffs claims and award Defendants 
their reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellate Court "review[s] a decision granting a motion to dismiss for correctness, 
granting no deference to the decision of the district court." Scott v. Utah Cnty., 2015 UT 64,, 13. 
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the claim in the light most favorable 
to the Plaintiff and make all reasonable inference in Plaintiffs favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 823 P .2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991 ). Although the court must accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true, the sufficiency of a complaint "must be determined by the 
facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated." Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 2001 UT 25, ,r 26, 21 P.3d 198 (quoting Elle/sen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912,915 (Utah 
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1974)) . "Mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant 
surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary judgment." Chapman By 
Through Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989). 
"Under a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal~ [the court's] inquiry is concerned solely with 'the 
sufficiency of the pleadings, [ and] not the underlying merits of [the] case.'" Alvarez v. Galetka, 
933 P.2d 987,989 (Utah 1997). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Appropriately Refused to Consider Allegations Outside of 
Plaintiff's Complaint and this Court Should Not Consider Allegations Outside of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
A Motion to Dismiss challenges the sufficiency of a complaint in stating a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, thus the analysis of whether a complaint is sufficient is confined to 
the allegations within the pleading itself. UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b). Also see, Alvarez v. Galetka, 
933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for 
failing to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In response, Plaintiff filed a 
"Verified Opposition" with numerous exhibits and sub-exhibits in an attempt to bolster the 
allegations within the Complaint. (R. 43-355.) Such attempt was inappropriate where a motion to 
dismiss rests entirely on whether the facts as alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint sufficiently 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Thus, the trial court appropriately refused to 
consider any allegations outside of those in the Complaint. (R. 377.) 
Once again, Plaintiff has attempted to bolster the sufficiency of his Complaint by 
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including in his Brief a Statement of"Additional Relevant Facts". (Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-24) 
Anything outside of the allegations within the original Complaint should not be considered. 
II. The District Court Appropriately Refused to Convert the Motion to Dismiss 
into a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have converted the motion to dismiss to one for 
summary judgment. (Appellant's Brief, p. 28). While it is true that when a motion to dismiss is 
accompanied by affidavits1 it may be treated as a motion for summary judgment, a "court 
should not on [its] own initiative try to convert a motion for dismissal into one for summary 
judgment." Hill v. Grant Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 123,477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970)(emphasis 
added). Thus, the district court's decision not to consider the extraneous exhibits, declarations, 
and other alleged evidence effectively converting the Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on its own initiative was appropriate and should be affirmed. (R. 377.) 
III. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Plaintiff's Claim for Alienation of 
Affection. 
The essence of the tort of alienation of affection "is the protection of the love, society, 
companionship, and comfort that form the foundation of a marriage and give rise to the unique 
bonding that occurs in a successful marriage." Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P .2d 8, 12 (Utah 
1991). To state a claim for alienation of affection, a plaintiff must plead with clear and 
1 Even where affidavits and other documents outside the pleadings are submitted, such submission is not a 
basis for conversion to summary judgement. See Oakwood Village LLC v. A./bertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 1[ 14, 104 
P.3d 1226, 1232 (citing Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Scho. Bd o/Educa., 232 F.3d 1334, 1342 ( 10th 
Cir. 2000). 
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convincing evidence (Heiner v. Simpson, 2001 UT 39, n. 2, 23 P.3d 1041): (a) [t]he fact of 
marriage, (b) that the defendant wilfully and intentionally, ( c) alienated the wife's affections, ( d) 
resulting in the loss of the comfort, society and consortium of the wife, and (e) (to justify 
punitive damages) a charge of malice." Wilson v. Oldroyd, 267 P.2s 759, 763 (Utah 1954). 
Furthermore, Plaintiff must prove that the Defendants' conduct constituted "the controlling cause 
of the alienation of affections" meaning that the "[ d]efendant' s conduct must have outweighed 
the combined effect of all other causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff spouse and the 
alienated spouse." Heiner v. Simpson, 2001 UT 39, n. 2, 23 P.3d 1041 (citing Nelson v. Jacob, 
669 P.2d 1207, 1219 (Utah 1983)). In Nelson v. Jacobsen, the Utah Supreme Court described 
the type of affection that must have existed in the marriage in order for an alienation of affection 
claim to be sustained, stating Plaintiff must show that the wife "and her husband were happily 
married and that a genuine love and affection existed between them" and "that the love and 
affection so existing was alienated and destroyed." 669 P .2d 1207, 1218 ( 19 83 ). Plaintiff failed 
to allege with sufficient specificity facts supporting several required elements to sustain a cause 
of action for alienation of affection. 
A husband's claim to his wife's affections only exists while the parties are married. In 
addition, an actual genuine love and affection must have existed between the parties in order for 
it to have ever been destroyed. In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that Plaintiff and Spouse were 
married on June 26, 1998. Plaintiff petitioned for divorce and received a default decree of 
divorce on March 4, 2013. (R. 2.) At no place in his Complaint does Plaintiff allege facts of a 
genuine love and affection existing between him and Spouse. If anything, his facts appear to 
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state that there was no love in the relationship for the Defendants to cause to be alienated. 
Plaintiff states that during his affair with another woman during the marriage, Plaintiff found 
"many aspects of love, companionship, and intimacy with N.B. which he longed for and rarely 
ever enjoyed in his Marriage to [Spouse]." (R. 2). (emphasis added). Furthermore, a vast 
majority of Plaintiffs factual allegations are without date or time period. Plaintiff obtained a 
default divorce in March, 2013 and yet he continued to reside in the marital home and to 
continue to have a relationship with Spouse for nearly 6 months after he filed for and obtained 
the default divorce. (R. 2, 11.) These undated allegations may have just as well occurred in this 
six month period after the divorce, and thus the culmination of the injury, if any loving 
relationship actually existed, would have occurred when the marriage no longer existed. 
Plaintiff fails to sufficiently support his claim that the Defendants acted wilfully and 
intentionally to alienate Spouse's affections. The only non-conclusory facts Plaintiff asserts 
relevant to this cause of action are that Defendant Loretta Wood Woodrum allegedly stated at the 
wedding festivities: "I don't approve of [the marriage] and will do all I can to make sure it 
doesn't last long." (R. 3.) Plaintiff also claims that after his affair, Defendant Loretta Wood 
Woodrum allegedly stated to Spouse that Spouse was 'stupid for staying with [Plaintiff]' and 
insisting that she needed to get a divorce from him." (R. 18.) Instead of specific factual 
allegations that Defendants wilfully and intentionally alienated the wife's affections, Plaintiff 
makes conclusory allegations that the Defendants engaged in manipulation and a "spirit of 
alienation." Plaintiff supports these conclusions with the allegations of Defendants asking 
Spouse to travel to Salt Lake City to look for a house, (R. 9.); Defendants pressuring Spouse to 
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go on a trip to California when Plaintiff and Spouse were to meet with their spiritual advisor, (R. 
6.); Defendant sending text messages to family, friends, and church members telling them of 
Plaintiffs extramarital affair, (R. 12.); and Defendants accusing Plaintiff of stealing money from 
the home safe~ (R. 18.). These allegations of fact, even taken as true, do not sufficiently support 
Plaintiffs claim for alienation of affection against Defendants because Plaintiff has not asserted 
facts showing Defendants willfully alienated Spouse's affections for Plaintiff resulting in the loss 
of consortium. See Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ~ 
26, 21 P.3d 198. 
Plaintiff fails to sufficiently support his claim that defendant's alleged actions were the 
controlling cause of the dissolution of the Marriage, so much so that it completely outweighed 
the combined effect of all other causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff spouse and the 
alienated spouse. Many of Plaintiffs averments indicate issues with or choices of Spouse rather 
than with the Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that Spouse never became a successfully independent 
adult or wife, (R. 4.); has unresolved issues from childhood, (R. 5, 13.); chose not to move into 
the home in Henderson, NV, (R. 5.); discontinued couples therapy, (R.7.); went years without 
having sexual relations with Plaintiff, (R.7.); chose to move in with Defendants to help them 
settle into their new house, (R. 9.); chose to remain in the Defendants' home, (R. 11.); told the 
children that Plaintiff and Spouse cannot speak directly with one another because Plaintiff is 
'mean," (R. 13.); took Defendants to appointments, prepared them meals, and took care of them, 
(R. 8, 16.); joined Defendants for vacations, holidays and Sunday dinners, (R. 18, 19.). 
Furthermore, Plaintiff admits to a host of alleged facts of his own behavior which 
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estranged the parties from each other including that he chose to stay away from Spouse because 
of the side effects of her alleged bulimia, (R. 13.), that he spent the vast majority of his time apart 
from Spouse, (R. 3.), that he had an affair with a woman in California in which he fulfilled his 
needs for love, companionship, and intimacy, (R. 7.); that he frequently disagreed with his 
Spouse on how to raise their children, (R. 14.); and that he chose to live in the basement away 
from the family (R. 10.). These are a host of circumstances and conduct on behalf of Plaintiff 
that most certainly contributed to the marital discord and, taken together as true, overwhelm the 
alleged conduct by Defendants. 
Plaintiff fails on several points to sufficiently state a claim for alienation of affection. 
Plaintiff fails to sufficiently state facts showing Defendants willfully alienated Spouse's 
affections resulting in the loss of consortium, that Defendants' actions were the primary 
controlling cause, or even that there was a loving relationship between the parties. Therefore, the 
district court's judgment dismissing Complaint for failing to sufficiently state a claim for 
alienation of affection should be affirmed. 
IV. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Plaintiff's Claim for Negligence. 
To state a claim of negligence generally, Plaintiff must establish: "(1) that the defendant 
owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach of duty 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries 
or damages." Callister v. Snowbird Corp., 2014 UT App 243, ,r 11, 337 P.3d 1044, 1048 cert. 
Denied sub nom. Callister v. Snowbird, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2015) (internal citations omitted). 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants negligently interfered with the marital relationship of Plaintiff 
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and Spouse. (R. 24.) Yet, Plaintiff cites no legal authority supporting such a cause of action in his 
Complaint or Brief. The only source of authority to which he points to support this claim is 
Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80, (Appellant's Brief, p. 3). Webb does not support Plaintiffs 
cause of action for negligent interference with a marital relationship. It merely supports a claim 
for negligence. Plaintiff claims his injuries to be contention, discord, dissatisfaction in his 
marital relationship with Spouse culminating in the dissolution of the marriage, and severe 
emotional distress. (R. 24.). Damages can only be collected for these injuries under Utah law 
under an action for alienation of affection, intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, 
and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Each of these claims has its own requisite 
elements. No claim exists for negligent interference with the marital relationship under Utah 
law. Therefore, the district court's judgment dismissing the Complaint for failing to state a 
claim for negligence should be affirmed. 
V. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Plaintiff's Claim for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must sufficiently 
plead facts that defendant: 
intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of 
inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known 
that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered 
outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality. 
Cabaness v. Thomas, 20 IO UT 23 1 36, 232 P.3d 486 (quoting Bennett v. Jones, Waldo 
Holbrook, & McDonough, 2003 UT 9,158, 70 P.3d 17). 
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To be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must 
be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. Conduct is not necessarily outrageous 
merely because it is tortious, injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to 
punitive damages, or because it is illegal. The liability for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook, & McDonough, 2003 UT 9,164 70 P.3d 17 (internal 
citation and quotations omitted). 
Courts have been hesitant to allowing recovery in claims for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, because of the subjective nature of emotional distress. In 
order to determine whether a complaint raises a valid cause of action, the 
sufficiency of Plaintiffs compliant, must be determined by facts pleaded rather 
than conclusions stated. 
Id., at 158-59 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Plaintiff fails to make the specific claim that the Defendants intentionally engaged in the 
alleged conduct with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress. At most, Plaintiff claims that 
Defendants "knew or should have known that through their actions and/or omissions, [Plaintiff] 
would suffer severe emotional distress." (R. 25.) Without the element of having the purpose to 
inflict extreme emotional distress, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege facts that any reasonable 
person would have known that such conduct would result in emotional distress to the victim 
AND that Defendants' alleged actions are the sort of outrageous conduct necessary to state a 
claim for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress. 
Plaintiffs factual allegations fall far short of alleging the sort of outrageous or intolerable 
conduct necessary to state a claim for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress. 
Instead of specific factual allegations of statements made by Defendants, Plaintiff makes 
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conclusory allegations that his former mother-in-law was generally "a very negative and abusive 
person;" (R. 8.); that she screamed "obscenities and very derogatory statements about 
[Plaintiff];" (R. 9.) and that she was "not careful about having negative and disparaging 
conversations about Plaintiff in front of the children." (R. 10.) The only specific verbal 
statements Plaintiff claims were made by Defendants are that his former mother-in-law called 
him "such words as[:] bastard, asshole, stupid, a piece of shit, and many other inappropriate 
names." (R. 14.) These fall squarely into the category of "mere insults." Plaintiffs further 
allegations include Defendants sending texts to family, friends, and ward members telling them 
of Plaintiffs extramarital affair, (R. 12.); picking up lunches for the children from multiple 
restaurants several times per week despite Plaintiffs request that it be stopped, (R. 17).; 
maintaining one of the children's pictures on Defendants' Google profile despite Plaintiffs 
request that it be removed, (R. 17.); telling their Bishop that Plaintiff and Spouse were 
completely broke and they couldn't take care of their own needs, (R. 19.); accusing Plaintiff of 
stealing $13,000 from the home safe, Compl., (R. 20.); and attempting to have Plaintiff arrested, 
(R. 21.) Even if taken as true, Plaintiffs allegations do not show that Defendants engaged in 
conduct towards Plaintiff which was so outrageous or intolerable to support recovery in an action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Finally, Plaintiff fails to state any specific form of extreme emotional distress other than 
general allegations of hurt feelings and a refusal to spend time with his family because he did not 
want to associate with his in-laws. The emotional distress Plaintiff claims to have suffered is the 
loss of his wife's affection (although he also fails to claim that there was ever any affection to 
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lose), general embarrassment, hurt feelings, and a general desire to not associate with Defendants 
to the extent that he remained in their basement and refused to attend family functions in the 
upper levels for fear of interacting with Defendants. Yet Plaintiff also claims to have remained 
in the marital home with Defendants and Spouse during and after his affair with another woman 
in California and for approximately 6 months after he personally filed and obtained a default 
decree of divorce, indicating that the emotional distress must not have been bad enough for him 
to remove himself from the situation even after he ended the marriage. Plaintiffs injuries are no 
different than the type normally suffered when one remains in a difficult relationship, a 
relationship fails, and/or when one intentionally remains in the domicile with people who appear 
to dislike you. 
In summary, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Defendants intentionally engaged in 
conduct with the purpose of causing extreme emotional distress. Plaintiff also fails to 
demonstrate that Defendants should have known that extreme emotional distress would result 
from their alleged conduct and that their conduct was so outrageous as to permit recovery. 
Therefore, the district court's order dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint for failing to state a claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be affirmed. 
VI. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Plaintiff's Claim for Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must sufficiently 
plead facts that an individual (a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable 
risk of causing the distress, ... and (b) from facts known to him, should have realized that the 
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distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. , 858 P.2d. 970, 970 (Utah 1993). The emotional distress suffered "must be severe; it 
must be such that "a reasonable [person] normally constituted, would be unable to adequately 
cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Id. at 975 (quoting 
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 172,472 P.2d 509, 520 (Hawaii 1970.) In addition, "it is not 
enough for a plaintiff to merely allege emotional distress. Instead, she must prove that distress 
by means of severe physical or mental manifestations." Id. at 975. Negligent infliction of 
emotional distress does not provide protection and compensation for much of the emotional 
distress which we endure. Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644,666, 771 P.2d 814,828 (1989). 
Plaintiff fails to plead facts other than bare allegations of emotional distress and a fear of 
interacting with Defendants to the point that he would not come out of the basement. (R. 11.) 
Plaintiff alleges that while he lived in the basement of Defendants' home, he felt "threatened, 
uncomfortable, unsafe, unwanted, and even fearful of the next round of disparagement that he ... 
would be forced to endure." (R. 11.) He also generally claims feeling alienated, (R. 11, 12, 20, 
21.), ignored, (R. 17, 18.), criticized, (R. 19.), and awkward., (R. 19.). Aside from these feelings, 
Plaintiff alleges no symptoms of severe emotional distress. Neither does Plaintiff allege facts 
sufficient to establish that the Defendants' conduct constituted negligence of the type likely to 
cause severe and unmanageable mental distress in a reasonable person normally constituted. See 
Moutain Fuel, 858 P.2d at 975. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that in the midst of this he was still 
capable of orchestrating an affair with another woman, (R. 2.), of filing for divorce (R. 7.), and 
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of choosing to remain in the marital home with Defendants after having obtained a default decree 
of divorce, (R. 10.). These pleaded facts do not rise to the level required by law to provide for a 
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the district court's order dismissing 
the Complaint for failing to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's grant of dismissal for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted should be affirmed and Defendants should be awarded their 
attorneys fees incurred in this action. 
Respectfully Submitted the 25th day of August, 2016. 
WARD & KING, PLLC 
Attorney for Defendants 
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